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In this letter, we concentrate on the very recently proposed Measurement Device Independent
Quantum Key Distribution (MDI QKD) protocol by Lo, Curty and Qi (PRL, 2012). We study
how one can suitably present an eavesdropping strategy on MDI QKD, that is in the direction of
the fundamental CNOT attack on BB84 protocol, though our approach is quite different. In this
strategy, Eve will be able to know expected half of the secret bits communicated between Alice
and Bob with certainty (probability 1) without introducing any error. Further, for the remaining
bits, where Eve will only be able to predict the bit values as in random guess (with probability
1
2
), she will certainly find out whether her interaction induced an error in the secret bits between
the communicating parties. Given the asymmetric nature of the CNOT attack, we also introduce
Hadamard gates to present a symmetric version. Though our analysis does not refute the security
claims in MDI QKD, adapting the CNOT attack in this scenario requires nontrivial approach using
entanglement swapping.
Keywords: CNOT Attack, Eavesdropping, Entangle-
ment Swapping, Hadamard Gate, Key Distribution,
Quantum Cryptography.
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of quantum key distribution was introduced
by Bennet and Brassard, that is famous as the BB84
protocol [1, 2]. Against BB84 [2], one of the most funda-
mental attack in this area is known as the CNOT attack
that uses a CNOT gate. In this case, Eve can obtain
complete information for the qubits sent in Z basis with-
out creating any disturbance. However, for the qubits
sent in X basis, Eve can not have any advantage and it
also induces a disturbance as high as 1
2
.
There are several variants of the traditional BB84 pro-
tocol that received attention in literature. The very re-
cent proposals [3, 4] are motivated from resistance against
side channel attacks where they allow an untrusted party
in the protocol. In particular, to resist detector side chan-
nel attacks, measurement device independent quantum
key distribution idea has been presented in [4]. We will
show how the fundamental idea of CNOT attack can be
suitably modified to be accommodated in this scenario.
As this proposal is very recent, to the best of our knowl-
edge, such attack has not yet been studied. The CNOT
attack is inherently asymmetric. Thus, we exploit the
Hadamard gate towards a symmetric version of this at-
tack.
In MDI QKD [4], Alice and Bob need not measure any
qubit, and all the measurements are executed at Eve’s
end, an untrusted third-party. Thus, for eavesdropping
strategies, it is natural to consider that Eve herself will
try to gather information about the secret key while as-
sisting Alice and Bob. That is why, this attack can be
termed as third-party attack. While the idea of [3] uses
entanglement swapping [5] for building the protocol, it
is interesting to note that we exploit this for third-party
CNOT attack against MDI QKD [4]. The application of
entanglement swapping is evident in such protocols (ei-
ther in design or in analysis) due to the involvement of
the third-party.
Let us now present a few notations that we will be us-
ing. By BERAB we denote the Bit Error Rate for the key
bits between Alice and Bob. By PE , we denote the Suc-
cess Probability of Eve in correctly guessing the bit that
Alice sent to Bob in form of a qubit. The eavesdropping
technique (that we present here) considers that Eve will
either get the complete information about the bit, i.e.,
PE = 1 or she will have no information at all other than
the random guess, i.e., PE =
1
2
. However, in the second
case, Eve will have some other kind of information as fol-
lows. By piE , we denote the success probability of Eve in
correctly guessing whether an error gets introduced dur-
ing the communication between Alice and Bob. That is,
in this case, Eve may not have any knowledge about the
value of the bit, but she exactly knows whether an error
has occurred or not during the communication between
Alice and Bob, i.e., piE = 1.
II. CNOT ATTACK ON MDI QKD [4]
To understand this algorithm, we use Bell states.
These are two-qubit entangled states that can form or-
thogonal basis. The four Bell states can be written as
|Φ±〉 = 1√
2
[|00〉 ± |11〉], |Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
[|01〉 ± |10〉]. The
untrusted third-party Eve measures the states received
from Alice and Bob in this basis and informs the mea-
surement result back to them. For eavesdropping pur-
poses, we will also study some other measurements by
Eve on the qubits through which she will interact with
the qubits sent by Alice and Bob. For such purposes,
based on the public discussion between Alice and Bob,
Eve will either measure in Bell basis or in computational
basis, i.e., |00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉. Before proceeding further,
let us first explain MDI QKD [4].
1. Alice and Bob create random bit strings at their
2ends and encodes the bits in either Z or X basis
randomly and send those to Eve.
2. Eve receives each pair of qubits (one from Alice and
one from Bob) and measures them in Bell basis.
The detection results are publicly announced.
3. For the cases where the basis of Bob and Alice
match
(a) if the qubits of Alice and Bob are in Z basis
and the measurement results at Eve are |Ψ±〉,
one of Alice or Bob has to flip the bit;
(b) if the qubits of Alice and Bob are in X basis
and the measurement result at Eve is |Ψ−〉 or
|Φ−〉, one of Alice or Bob has to flip the bit;
4. Information reconciliation (using error correcting
codes) and privacy amplification are performed by
Alice and Bob on the remaining n bits (let us call
that the raw key) to obtain m shared key bits (final
key).
In the actual implementation, Eve can identify only two
(|Ψ±〉) of the four Bell states and that is claimed to be
enough for the security proof to go through [4]. Our
analysis will also go through in a similar manner in such
a scenario.
We present the following table for understanding all
the cases. When Alice and Bob generate qubits in dif-
ferent bases then those pairs of qubits are discarded and
thus this is not shown in the table.
Qubits sent by Probability (Eve’s end) Flip
Alice Bob |Φ+〉 |Φ−〉 |Ψ+〉 |Ψ−〉
|0〉 |0〉 1
2
1
2
0 0 No
|0〉 |1〉 0 0 1
2
1
2
Yes
|1〉 |0〉 0 0 1
2
1
2
Yes
|1〉 |1〉 1
2
1
2
0 0 No
|+〉 |+〉 1
2
0 1
2
0 No
|+〉 |−〉 0 1
2
0 1
2
Yes
|−〉 |+〉 0 1
2
0 1
2
Yes
|−〉 |−〉 1
2
0 1
2
0 No
A. The CNOT attack
The eavesdropping model in this case is as follows,
where the untrusted third-party Eve will try to obtain
the information. Eve will take the qubits from Alice and
Bob and put each one of them in the control input of a
CNOT gate and she will supply |0〉 in the target. The
outputs corresponding to the control qubits of the CNOT
gates will be measured in the Bell basis by Eve and the
result will be communicated to Alice and Bob. Eve stores
the output corresponding to the target in her quantum
memory. Then Alice and Bob will go for public discus-
sion to announce their bases. Knowing these, Eve will try
to extract information from the outputs corresponding to
the target qubits of the CNOT gates.
Consider that both Bob and Alice communicated in
Z basis. In such a case, Eve will be able to copy these
perfectly using CNOT gates without creating any distur-
bance to the qubits sent by Alice and Bob. If the mea-
surement output at Eve is |Φ±〉, then the bits of Alice
and Bob match. Similarly, if the measurement output
at Eve is |Ψ±〉, then the bits of Alice and Bob do not
match and one of them needs to toggle his/her bit. Thus
in this case, Eve will obtain all the information without
creating any disturbance. Note that, in this case, Eve
will measure her target qubit in computational basis, i.e.,
|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉.
When Bob and Alice communicate in X basis, then
error is introduced by the CNOT attack and the situa-
tion can be seen as an example of entanglement swap-
ping [5]. Let us explain one specific case here. The other
cases will be similar. Consider that Alice and Bob both
send |+〉. Thus, after the application of CNOT gates by
Eve, there will be entangled states
|0A0E1〉+|1A1E1〉√
2
and
|0B0E2〉+|1B1E2〉√
2
corresponding to Alice and Bob respec-
tively. Now the qubits corresponding to Alice and Bob
will be measured in Bell basis. One can see that( |0A0E1〉+ |1A1E1〉√
2
)
⊗
( |0B0E2〉+ |1B1E2〉√
2
)
can be written as 1
2
(|Φ+AB〉|Φ+E1E2〉 + |Φ−AB〉|Φ−E1E2〉 +
|Ψ+AB〉|Ψ+E1E2〉+ |Ψ−AB〉|Ψ−E1E2〉).
The correct measurement in this case is |Φ+AB〉 or
|Ψ+AB〉 that happens with probability 12 and in such a case
after the bases of Alice and Bob are published, Eve will
measure either |Φ+E1E2〉 or |Ψ+E1E2〉 and she will be able
to know that no error has been introduced. However, if
the measurement result becomes |Φ−E1E2〉 or |Ψ−E1E2〉 (this
happens with probability 1
2
too), then Eve knows that
an error has been introduced, and she will not be able to
know the secret bit. Similarly, we can analyse the other
cases and get the following as in Table I. After Bob and
Alice publicly declares their bases, if that is Z, then Eve
obtains all the information without introducing any error
by measuring in computational basis |00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉.
If the basis is X , then Eve’s interaction introduces error
at the rate of 1
2
, but Eve does not obtain any informa-
tion about the secret bits. In these cases, if Eve measures
|Φ+E1E2〉 or |Ψ+E1E2〉 then she knows that no disturbance
has been introduced. If Eve measures |Φ−E1E2〉 or |Ψ−E1E2〉
then she understands that error has been introduced, i.e.,
Bob and Alice will land into a complement bit value at
this location of the secret key. To summarize, we have
the following situation.
Basis Operation BERAB PE piE
(Alice, Bob) by Eve
Z CNOT 0 1 1
X CNOT 0.5 0.5 1
3⊕
·
⊕
·From Alice
|0〉 |0〉
From Bob
To Alice To Bob
Eve (untrusted third-party)
M
M
⇑
Measurement result in Bell Basis
FIG. 1: CNOT attack on MDI QKD
Alice, Bob Eve (after CNOT attack)
|+〉, |+〉 1
2
(
|Φ+
AB
〉|Φ+
E1E2
〉+ |Φ−
AB
〉|Φ−
E1E2
〉+ |Ψ+
AB
〉|Ψ+
E1E2
〉+ |Ψ−
AB
〉|Ψ−
E1E2
〉
)
|+〉, |−〉 1
2
(
|Φ+
AB
〉|Φ−
E1E2
〉+ |Φ−
AB
〉|Φ+
E1E2
〉 − |Ψ+
AB
〉|Ψ−
E1E2
〉 − |Ψ−
AB
〉|Ψ+
E1E2
〉
)
|−〉, |+〉 1
2
(
|Φ+
AB
〉|Φ−
E1E2
〉+ |Φ−
AB
〉|Φ+
E1E2
〉+ |Ψ+
AB
〉|Ψ−
E1E2
〉+ |Ψ−
AB
〉|Ψ+
E1E2
〉
)
|−〉, |−〉 1
2
(
|Φ+
AB
〉|Φ+
E1E2
〉+ |Φ−
AB
〉|Φ−
E1E2
〉 − |Ψ+
AB
〉|Ψ+
E1E2
〉 − |Ψ−
AB
〉|Ψ−
E1E2
〉
)
TABLE I: State with Eve after the CNOT attack.
B. The symmetric version
As we have seen in the previous section, the third-party
CNOT attack does not introduce any error in Z basis,
but induces errors in half of the cases in X basis. Thus
this eavesdropping scenario is asymmetric. To provide a
symmetric scenario, we make the following modification.
Let H be the Hadamard gate, I be the identity gate
(both works on a single qubit) and C be the CNOT gate
(that works on two qubits). Let us define
Pu = (H ⊗ I)uC(H ⊗ I)u for u = 0, 1,
i.e., P0 = C and P1 = (H ⊗ I)C(H ⊗ I). One can check
that
P0(|00〉) = |00〉, P0(|10〉) = |11〉,
P0(|+ 0〉) = |++〉+|−−〉√
2
, P0(| − 0〉) = |+−〉+|−+〉√
2
,
P1(|00〉) = |0+〉+|1−〉√
2
, P1(|10〉) = |0−〉+|1+〉√
2
,
P1(|+ 0〉) = |+ 0〉, P1(| − 0〉) = | − 1〉.
Eve applies either P0 or P1 based on the outcome of an
unbiased coin toss. The case of applying P0 (CNOT)
for each of Bob and Alice has been described in previous
section.
In case, P1 is applied, and both Bob and Alice com-
municate in X basis then Eve will be able to obtain the
secret bits completely without creating any disturbance
by measuring her target qubits in computational basis
|00〉, |01〉, |10〉, |11〉.
However, if Alice and Bob communicate in Z basis
and P1 is applied, then Eve will only be able to predict
the secret bit as in the case of random guess (i.e., with
probability 1
2
), though she will be able to exactly identify
whether error has been introduced. This case is similar
to the one where Alice and Bob communicate in X basis
and P0, i.e., CNOT is applied. The different cases are
explained as follows in Table II Thus, when P0 and P1
are used randomly with probability 1
2
in each case, we
have the following outcomes.
Basis Operation BERAB PE piE
(Alice, Bob) by Eve
Z P0 0 1 1
X P0 0.5 0.5 1
Z P1 0.5 0.5 1
X P1 0 1 1
The complete algorithm for Hadamard assisted CNOT
attack is as follows.
1. Eve applies either P0 or P1 on the qubits |µA〉 and
|µB〉 (communicated by Alice and Bob to Eve) and
|0〉 (ancilla supplied by Eve) for both the cases.
2. The two-qubit state (outputs corresponding to
|µA〉, |µB〉) is measured in Bell basis and the re-
sult is communicated to Alice and Bob. Further,
both the outputs corresponding to the |0〉 qubits
(the target ones) are kept with Eve.
3. After the public discussion between Alice and Bob,
Eve comes to know about the cases where Alice
and Bob communicated in the same basis. The
cases where Bob and Alice communicated in differ-
ent bases are in any case discarded.
4. If Alice and Bob both communicated qubits in Z
(respectively X) basis and Eve applied P0 (respec-
tively P1), then Eve obtains the corresponding se-
cret bit correctly without introducing any error by
measuring the pair of qubits in computational ba-
sis.
4⊕
·
⊕
·From Alice
|0〉 |0〉
From Bob
To Alice To Bob
Eve (untrusted third-party)
Measurement result in Bell Basis
M
M
⇑
HH H H
FIG. 2: Hadamard assisted CNOT attack on MDI QKD
Alice, Bob Eve (after Hadamard assisted CNOT attack, i.e., with P1)
|0〉, |0〉 1
2
(
|Φ+
AB
〉|Φ+
E1E2
〉+ |Φ−
AB
〉|Ψ+
E1E2
〉+ |Ψ+
AB
〉|Φ−
E1E2
〉 − |Ψ−
AB
〉|Ψ−
E1E2
〉
)
|0〉, |1〉 1
2
(
|Φ+
AB
〉|Φ−
E1E2
〉 − |Φ−
AB
〉|Ψ−
E1E2
〉+ |Ψ+
AB
〉|Φ+
E1E2
〉+ |Ψ−
AB
〉|Ψ+
E1E2
〉
)
|1〉, |0〉 1
2
(
|Φ+
AB
〉|Φ−
E1E2
〉+ |Φ−
AB
〉|Ψ−
E1E2
〉+ |Ψ+
AB
〉|Φ+
E1E2
〉 − |Ψ−
AB
〉|Ψ+
E1E2
〉
)
|1〉, |1〉 1
2
(
|Φ+
AB
〉|Φ+
E1E2
〉 − |Φ−
AB
〉|Ψ+
E1E2
〉+ |Ψ+
AB
〉|Φ−
E1E2
〉+ |Ψ−
AB
〉|Ψ−
E1E2
〉
)
TABLE II: State with Eve after the Hadamard assisted CNOT attack.
5. If Alice and Bob both communicated qubits in Z
(respectively X) basis and Eve applied P1 (respec-
tively P0), then Eve can only guess about the com-
municated bit with probability 1
2
(i.e., no informa-
tion better than the random guess) inducing a bit
error with probability 1
2
.
In such cases, Eve measures her qubits in Bell ba-
sis and if the measurement output is |Φ+E1E2〉 or
|Ψ+E1E2〉 (respectively |Φ−E1E2〉 or |Ψ−E1E2〉) then Eve
knows that error has not been (respectively has
been) introduced in the communication.
As Alice and Bob settle on either Z or X basis equally
likely, and Eve also applies P0 or P1 based on the outcome
of an unbiased coin, the error rate in both Z and X basis
will be equal. Thus the attack is a symmetric one. On
an average, BERAB =
1
4
, PE =
3
4
and piE = 1.
Moreover, the eavesdropping by Eve may be induced
in a portion of the communicated bits instead of all, say a
proportion ζ. This is due to the fact that if Alice and Bob
notice a channel noise more than some threshold value,
then they will abort the protocol. In such a case, Eve
will be able to guess expected ζ
2
proportion of bits with
probability 1. For the remaining bits, though she will
not gain anything other than the random guess, she will
be able to know whether error has been induced during
the communication between Alice and Bob. Thus, on an
average, BERAB =
ζ
4
, PE =
3ζ
4
and piE = ζ. Due to the
symmetric nature of this eavesdropping strategy, Alice
and Bob would not be able to distinguish this eavesdrop-
ping from channel noise.
III. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we have considered how CNOT kind of
attack can be mounted on a recently proposed variant
of BB84, which is referred as Measurement Device Inde-
pendent Quantum Key Distribution (MDI QKD) proto-
col [4]. Though our analysis is in the direction of CNOT
attack on BB84 [2], it requires a different approach by the
third-party to execute the attack exploiting entanglement
swapping. Through this kind of eavesdropping, Eve will
exactly obtain around half of the secret bits communi-
cated between Alice and Bob. For the rest of the bits,
Eve will only be able to predict the bit values as in ran-
dom guess. However, she will certainly find out whether
her interaction induced an error between Alice and Bob.
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